Human beings naturally inquire into the nature of morality, asking questions about right and wrong, good and bad. In this prescriptive inquiry, we utilize specific ethical vocabulary and invoke various theories to explain morality's nature. Essentially, all moral theories address fundamental questions: What is the Good? Why is it Good? Where is the Good located?
Moral inquiry involves exploring different perspectives. Generally, prescriptive moral theories fall into three basic categories: teleological (consequentialist), deontological (duty-based), and virtue-based theories. These approaches often provide distinct, sometimes conflicting, answers to core ethical questions. This chapter aims to introduce these major ethical theories.
Upon successful completion of this chapter, students will be able to:
Activity:
Consider yourself: Are you generally someone who ‘does the right thing’? How do you determine what constitutes the 'right thing' in various situations?
We begin our exploration within normative ethics, which focuses on establishing standards or norms for conduct. It addresses theories of obligation (what actions are right/wrong) and theories of value (what states of affairs are good/bad). The primary concern of normative theories of obligation is to guide decision-making and judgment regarding actions in specific situations, addressing the question: how should we decide what is morally right or obligatory for an agent (oneself or another) in a given circumstance?
Key Aspects of Normative Ethics:
Central Questions in Normative Ethics:
What is Teleological/Consequentialist Ethics?
Teleological ethics, often summarized as "the end justifies the means," judges the morality of an action based solely on its consequences or outcomes (from Greek *telos*, meaning end or purpose). An action is considered right or wrong depending on the results it produces. Good intentions or adherence to rules are secondary; if the outcome is harmful, the act is judged morally wrong.
Moral theories generally fall into two main categories regarding the basis of moral judgment: (1) deontological and (2) teleological.
A teleological theory posits that the ultimate criterion for determining what is morally right, wrong, or obligatory is the non-moral value produced by the action or rule. The final judgment rests on comparing the amount of good produced versus evil, or the balance of good over evil.
For teleologists, the moral quality of actions, persons, or character traits depends entirely on the comparative *non-moral* value they bring about or intend to bring about. (Defining moral value in terms of moral value would be circular). Thus, teleological theories make rightness and moral goodness dependent on achieving the non-morally good.
To determine if an action is right or obligatory according to a teleological theory, one must first identify what constitutes non-moral good (e.g., happiness, knowledge, pleasure) and then assess whether the action in question effectively promotes the greatest balance of that good over evil.
Teleologists differ on what constitutes the non-morally good:
Deontological theories (from Greek *deon*, meaning duty) fundamentally reject the teleological premise. They deny that rightness, obligation, and moral goodness depend *solely* on maximizing non-moral good. Deontologists argue that other factors besides consequences determine moral rightness—such as features of the act itself (e.g., keeping a promise is intrinsically right), adherence to rules or duties (e.g., respecting rights, following divine commands), or motives.
While teleologists see maximizing good consequences as the *only* ultimate right-making characteristic, deontologists believe other factors are also intrinsically right-making, or that maximizing good is either not a moral requirement or not the *sole* basic one.
For a deontologist, an action can be morally right or obligatory even if it doesn't produce the best overall consequences, perhaps because it fulfills a duty or respects a right.
Forms of Teleological Ethics (Distinguished by Beneficiary):
This chapter will focus primarily on ethical egoism and utilitarianism.
Common morality often assumes we shouldn't be excessively self-centered; selfishness is generally frowned upon. However, historical and philosophical perspectives have challenged this, suggesting that perhaps humans are primarily oriented towards their own interests. This leads to two related but distinct concepts: psychological egoism and ethical egoism.
Some consequentialist views prioritize self-interest or group interest. For example, Machiavelli advocated using any means necessary to maintain political power, a consequentialist approach focused on the ruler's or party's ends, not necessarily the common good (thus distinct from utilitarianism).
Case for Discussion:
Imagine a Good Samaritan stops to help a stranded motorist, who then shoots and kills the Samaritan. Most would admire the Samaritan's action despite the tragic outcome. An ethical egoist, however, might argue the Samaritan acted wrongly. Why? Because for ethical egoism, the primary moral rule is: Look after your own self-interest. Stopping put the Samaritan's life at risk for no personal gain, violating this principle.
What is your perspective on the Samaritan's action in light of ethical egoism?
This theory is termed ethical egoism because it is a *normative* theory proposing how we *ought* to behave—namely, selfishly or in our own rational self-interest. The term "ethical" here simply indicates it's a theory *about* morality, one that advocates egoism as the correct moral stance.
Core Principle: "You should act always to maximize your own self-interest."
From this perspective, acting against one's self-interest is foolish. Cooperative or seemingly altruistic behavior is justified only if it ultimately serves one's own interests (e.g., "I treat others well *so that* they will treat me well"). This reinterprets reciprocity and rules like the Golden Rule through a lens of self-interest.
Argument Often Based on Psychological Egoism:
Ethical egoism doesn't preclude helping others, but the motivation must ultimately stem from self-benefit (e.g., feeling good, expecting future reciprocation, benefiting loved ones whose happiness contributes to one's own). It prioritizes *long-term* self-interest, which might involve actions like healthy eating or exercise that involve immediate discomfort for future gain.
The theory fundamentally asserts that only one's own welfare is morally significant. It doesn't necessarily endorse hedonism (seeking immediate pleasure); rational self-interest might require sacrifice or pain.
Applying Ethical Egoism:
Ethical egoism often rests on psychological egoism, which is a *descriptive* theory about human motivation, claiming that humans *are* inherently constituted to always seek their own advantage, welfare, or perceived greatest balance of good over evil (sometimes termed "self-love," "ego-satisfaction," or driven by the "pleasure principle").
If psychological egoism is true (i.e., if we *can only* act self-interestedly), then ethical egoism appears to be the only reasonable moral theory, as morality cannot demand the impossible ("ought implies can").
The core debate, therefore, often shifts to whether psychological egoism accurately describes human motivation: Do we *ever* genuinely desire others' welfare for its own sake, or is it always merely a means to our own ultimate satisfaction?
Philosophers like Bishop Butler offer counterarguments:
The Satisfaction Rebuttal and Counter:
*Egoist:* Even when helping others, the *real* goal is the satisfaction derived from helping; the act is just a means to self-satisfaction.
*Counter:* Satisfaction is the *result* of achieving a pre-existing goal (e.g., wanting the other person to benefit), not the goal itself. We feel satisfaction *because* we achieved what we desired for the other person. Confusing the object of desire with the resulting satisfaction is a key error (Butler's Stone).
If psychological egoism is false, the main argument for ethical egoism weakens significantly, though ethical egoism could still be defended on other grounds.
"That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers." - Francis Hutcheson (precursor to Bentham)
Dilemma for Discussion:
Imagine you are in Jigjiga with a dying millionaire. With his last breath, he makes you promise to deliver $2 million in cash to the Ethiopian Coffee Football Club for buying better players. Later, in Addis Ababa, you see an Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) appeal stating $2 million is desperately needed to save 100,000 people from starvation through sustainable aid. You trust ERCS completely. You reconsider your promise to the millionaire.
What is the morally right thing to do?
Traditional moral guides offer limited help here:
Resolving the millionaire dilemma often involves appealing to more fundamental moral rules or principles.
If you prioritized keeping your promise to the millionaire (following the principle "Always keep promises"), your reasoning aligns with deontology. Deontological theories emphasize duties, rules, and the intrinsic nature of actions, regardless of consequences. Promise-keeping is seen as intrinsically right.
If you prioritized giving the money to ERCS to maximize well-being (saving many lives), your reasoning aligns with teleological ethics (consequentialism). Here, the moral value lies in the outcome; the action producing the best consequences is deemed right.
Utilitarianism, unlike ethical egoism, is a *universal* teleological theory. It mandates maximizing the good (often defined as happiness or welfare) not just for oneself, but for *all* affected parties—the greatest good for the greatest number. In the dilemma, utilitarianism likely favors giving the money to ERCS due to the vastly greater positive consequences.
While utilitarian-like reasoning appears earlier (e.g., Epicurus focusing on individual pleasure), modern utilitarianism, emphasizing *general* happiness, originates primarily with British philosophers and social reformers Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). They aimed to create a rational, scientific basis for morality and law, focused on human needs and interests rather than tradition or dogma.
Bentham's utilitarianism has two core components:
Bentham advocated hedonistic utilitarianism: the right action maximizes the net balance of pleasure over pain for all affected.
To make utilitarianism scientific, Bentham proposed the hedonic calculus to quantify pleasure and pain based on seven factors:
In theory, one calculates the net utility (pleasure minus pain) for each alternative action, considering all affected individuals and all seven factors, then chooses the action with the highest score. Applying this to the millionaire dilemma: saving 100,000 lives likely yields vastly more "hedons" (units of happiness) than improving a football club.
Appeal of Bentham's approach: Simplicity (one principle), common sense alignment (focus on welfare), attempt at scientific objectivity and impartiality.
Responding to criticisms that Bentham's view valued base pleasures equally with higher pursuits (a "pig philosophy"), J.S. Mill modified utilitarianism. His version, often called eudaimonistic utilitarianism (from *eudaimonia*, Greek for happiness or flourishing), distinguishes between higher and lower pleasures based on *quality*, not just quantity.
Mill argued that intellectual, aesthetic, and social pleasures (higher pleasures) are intrinsically superior to purely sensual ones (lower pleasures).
Mill famously stated: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." Those who have experienced both types of pleasure recognize the superior quality of the higher ones.
For Mill, true happiness involves cultivating these higher faculties and experiencing a life rich in varied pleasures with minimal pain, founded on realistic expectations. His focus on qualities like knowledge, freedom, and friendship arguably moves beyond pure hedonism.
A key distinction within utilitarianism:
Act-Utilitarianism: Applies the principle of utility directly to each individual *act*. The right act is the one that produces the best consequences in that specific situation.
Critiques: Impractical to calculate consequences for every act; seems to justify actions that violate common moral rules (like lying or breaking promises) if doing so maximizes utility in a particular case.
Rule-Utilitarianism: Applies the principle of utility to determine the validity of *rules* of conduct. An act is right if it conforms to a valid moral rule. A rule is valid if its general acceptance would produce greater utility than alternative rules (or no rule).
Rationale: Acknowledges need for stable rules to guide behavior, coordinate actions, and avoid constant calculation. Focuses on the utility of *having* rules like "keep promises" or "tell the truth."
Trolley Problem Discussion:
You are driving a runaway trolley. You can steer it onto a sidetrack to avoid killing 5 workers on the main track, but doing so will kill 1 worker on the sidetrack. Should you steer onto the sidetrack? How would act- and rule-utilitarianism potentially analyze this?
Utilitarianism offers several appealing features:
Problem 1: Formulating the Principle
The slogan "greatest happiness for the greatest number" is ambiguous. Does it mean maximizing the *total* amount of happiness (which might favor a large population with moderate happiness) or the *highest average* happiness (which might favor a smaller, very happy population)? These goals can conflict. Furthermore, how exactly is happiness/utility measured and compared between individuals?
Problem 2: Calculating Consequences
Predicting *all* the consequences of an action, especially long-term ones, seems practically impossible. Act-utilitarianism, in particular, appears to demand superhuman foresight to determine which act truly maximizes utility over time.
Problem 3: Consistency of Rule-Utilitarianism
Critics argue rule-utilitarianism either collapses into act-utilitarianism (if rules can always be broken when doing so maximizes utility) or becomes a form of deontology (if rules are upheld even when breaking them would produce better immediate consequences). Maintaining a distinct, consistent rule-utilitarian position is challenging.
Problem 4: The No-Rest Objection
Utilitarianism seems to demand constant action to maximize utility. We should always be doing whatever yields the most good, potentially leaving no room for personal projects, leisure, or rest if sacrificing these could produce more overall happiness (e.g., by constantly working for charity). It appears overly demanding.
Problem 5: The Publicity Objection
Moral principles arguably should be public knowledge. However, some utilitarians might worry that publicly advocating utilitarianism (especially act-utilitarianism) could lead to miscalculation or abuse, suggesting it might be better if most people followed simpler, deontological rules. This creates a potential conflict with the publicity requirement.
Problem 6: The Relativism Objection
Rule-utilitarianism might appear relativistic if different rules maximize utility in different contexts (e.g., water conservation rules varying by climate). However, this isn't true relativism; the rule's validity depends on objective utility based on the *actual situation*, not just cultural acceptance.
Problem 7: Ends Justifying Immoral Means
A major objection is that utilitarianism could potentially justify actions widely considered immoral (e.g., lying, torture, sacrificing innocents) if doing so produces the greatest overall good.
Argument Structure:
Example: The Lying Objection
Critics like W.D. Ross argue utilitarianism wrongly implies lying is acceptable whenever it maximizes utility, conflicting with the intuition that truthfulness has intrinsic value. Utilitarians might reply that truthfulness *is* generally useful (a rule-utility) but lying is permissible in specific cases where it clearly maximizes good (e.g., white lies, lying to protect someone from harm).
Perhaps the most serious objection concerns justice. Utilitarianism seems capable of sacrificing individual rights or fairness for the sake of maximizing overall happiness.
Scenario 1 (Sheriff): To prevent a deadly riot, a sheriff contemplates framing an innocent person for a crime. Convicting the innocent person might maximize overall utility by restoring peace, but violates principles of justice.
Scenario 2 (Transplant Surgeon): A surgeon realizes she could save five patients needing organs by sacrificing one healthy patient who came for a check-up. This act arguably maximizes utility (5 lives saved > 1 lost), but profoundly violates justice and individual rights.
These scenarios suggest utilitarianism might conflict with fundamental notions of justice and individual rights, which many believe should not be overridden merely for utility gains. While extreme cases might test intuitions (e.g., sacrificing one innocent to prevent nuclear war), the apparent willingness of utilitarianism to permit injustice for the 'greater good' remains a central criticism.
Questions for Reflection:
Does the policy 'The end justifies the means' permit morally questionable acts for good outcomes?
A. Is it common in your experience for people to justify dishonest or unjust actions by appealing to good ends?
B. Consider a doctor misleading a depressed patient about their prognosis or prescribing unnecessary medication 'just in case'. Are these justifiable?
C. Does the prevalence of such behavior suggest utilitarianism aligns well with human tendencies, or does it highlight potential dangers?
In contrast to egoism, altruism holds that an action is right if its consequences are favorable for everyone *except* the person acting. It prioritizes others' welfare.
Arguments for altruism sometimes rely on psychological altruism (associated with Bishop Butler), the view that humans possess an inherent capacity for benevolence—acting out of genuine concern for others' well-being.
If psychological altruism exists, it counters psychological egoism. The debate centers on whether selfless motivations are genuinely possible. Consider Degu, a poor swimmer, risking his life to save a drowning child. Was his ultimate motivation self-benefit (e.g., social approval, feeling good)? Or was it genuine concern for the child, even at great personal risk? Altruism posits the latter is possible and morally commendable.
Activity:
Reflect on an individual or group you admire for apparent altruistic motivation. Describe their actions and explain the lessons learned from their example.
What duty requires of us?
While consequentialist theories (like utilitarianism and egoism) determine rightness based on outcomes, deontological theories argue that morality is based on duties, rules, obligations, or rights, independent of the consequences. Certain actions are considered intrinsically right or wrong based on their nature or the principles they uphold.
Deontology emphasizes intentions, motives, moral principles, and fulfilling one's duty. The rightness or wrongness of an act lies in the act itself or the rule it follows, not primarily in the results it produces. Some moral obligations are considered absolute, regardless of the potential consequences.
Classifying Duties
Philosopher Samuel Pufendorf (17th century) categorized duties:
One prominent deontological view bases morality on religion. The Divine Command Theory holds that ethical principles derive their validity solely from God's commands. An action is right because God commands it; an action is wrong because God forbids it. Without divine commands, objective morality wouldn't exist.
Core Theses of Strong DCT:
Implications: An act is forbidden/required iff God commands against/for it. It's permissible iff God commands neither. If God doesn't exist, nothing is ethically required, forbidden, or permitted (moral nihilism).
Challenges to Divine Command Theory
Another duty-based approach focuses on rights. A right is typically understood as a justified claim or entitlement that one person has against another's behavior (e.g., my right to life implies your duty not to kill me).
Correlativity Thesis: Often, rights in one person imply corresponding duties in others.
Early influential accounts, like John Locke's, grounded rights in natural law ordained by God, mandating respect for life, liberty, health, and property as fundamental, natural rights. Thomas Jefferson echoed this in the US Declaration of Independence (life, liberty, pursuit of happiness).
Traditional Features of Moral Rights:
Rights theory provides a framework where duties arise from respecting the fundamental entitlements of others.
The most influential deontological theory is arguably that of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant staunchly rejected consequentialism, arguing that the moral worth of an action lies in the *intention* or *will* behind it, specifically whether it conforms to duty derived from reason, not in the outcomes produced.
Kant sought a supreme principle of morality, derived from pure reason, which he called the Categorical Imperative. This principle dictates moral duties absolutely and universally, independent of personal desires or consequences.
Kant distinguished the Categorical Imperative (CI) from hypothetical imperatives.
For Kant, the only thing good without qualification is a good will—a will that acts *from* duty, motivated by respect for the moral law derived from reason (the CI), not merely *in accordance* with duty (which could be done from self-interest or inclination).
The test for whether an action aligns with a good will is whether the principle (maxim) guiding the action can be consistently willed as a universal law, applicable to all rational beings without contradiction. This leads to the first formulation of the CI.
A crucial aspect of Kant's ethics is the focus on intent or the maxim behind an action. The moral worth depends not on the outcome, but on *why* the action was performed.
Example:
Imagine someone considers murdering another but decides against it, *not* because murder is morally wrong, but solely because they fear getting caught. According to Kant, this person has *not* acted morally. Their decision stemmed from self-preservation (a hypothetical imperative), not from respect for the moral law (the categorical imperative). The action (or non-action) lacks moral worth.
However, if the person refrains from murder *because* they recognize it as inherently wrong according to a universalizable principle, *then* their non-action has moral worth, stemming from a good will acting from duty.
For Kant, true moral maxims must possess absolute necessity, applying universally to all rational beings, independent of specific circumstances or desires.
A. First Formulation:
"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction."
This formulation provides a test: Can the principle behind your action be applied universally to everyone without generating a logical or practical contradiction? If universalizing the maxim leads to a state where the action itself becomes impossible or undermines the very system it relies upon, then the action is morally forbidden (violates a perfect duty).
Example (False Promise): Maxim: "It is permissible to make false promises when convenient." If universalized, no one would trust promises, making the act of promising (and thus breaking promises) meaningless. The maxim contradicts itself when universalized. Therefore, making false promises violates a perfect duty.
Kant also distinguishes imperfect duties (e.g., developing talents, helping others). Maxims violating these might not lead to logical contradictions when universalized, but to states of affairs that no rational being could consistently *will* (e.g., a world where no one ever helps anyone else). These duties are still binding but allow more latitude in how they are fulfilled.
B. Second Formulation:
"Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end."
This formulation focuses on respecting the inherent worth and dignity of rational beings. Because humans possess reason and autonomy (the capacity for self-legislation), they are "ends in themselves," possessing intrinsic value. We must never treat people (including ourselves) *merely* as tools or instruments to achieve our own subjective ends.
Using someone as a means (e.g., hiring a plumber) is permissible if their autonomy and dignity are respected (they consent, are fairly compensated). Using them *merely* as a means (e.g., through deception, coercion, exploitation, slavery) violates their status as an end-in-themselves and is morally forbidden (violates a perfect duty). Suicide is also wrong because it treats one's own rational nature merely as a means to end suffering.
Treating someone as an end involves recognizing and respecting their capacity for rational choice and their inherent value.
C. Third Formulation: The Principle of Autonomy / Kingdom of Ends
"Therefore, every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends."
This formulation emphasizes autonomy—the idea that rational beings are self-legislating, creating the moral law through reason. However, the maxims we legislate for ourselves must be universalizable, suitable as laws for a hypothetical "Kingdom of Ends" where everyone is treated as both a law-maker (legislator) and an end-in-themselves. Our actions should reflect principles applicable and beneficial to all rational beings.
Problem: Rigidity and Conflicting Duties
A major criticism of Kant's theory is its perceived rigidity. Because the CI generates absolute, exceptionless duties (perfect duties), it seems unable to handle situations where duties conflict or where following a duty leads to disastrous consequences.
Example (Murderer at the Door): If a murderer asks for the location of their intended victim (who is hiding in your house), Kant's prohibition against lying (derived from the first formulation) seems to forbid misleading the murderer, even to save a life. This counterintuitive result suggests the theory might be too inflexible for complex moral realities. Similarly, dilemmas arise where any action seems to violate a perfect duty.
Activity:
Consider Kant's principle of universality.
a) Can you think of examples where universalizing a seemingly harmless maxim leads to problems, or where a universal rule seems inappropriate?
b) Do you agree with Kant that consequences are largely irrelevant to the moral assessment of an action's intent? Why or why not?
Addressing the rigidity of Kantianism and the potential injustices of utilitarianism, British philosopher W.D. Ross (1877–1971) proposed a deontological theory based on multiple, non-absolute duties he called prima facie duties. (*Prima facie* means "at first sight" or "on the surface").
A prima facie duty is a genuine moral duty that is binding *other things being equal*. It tells us what we ought to do, assuming no other moral factors conflict. However, in situations where prima facie duties conflict, one duty might override another.
Our actual duty in a specific situation is the prima facie duty that is most stringent or weighty after considering all conflicting prima facie duties. It's what we *ultimately* ought to do in that particular circumstance.
Ross viewed prima facie duties as fundamental moral guidelines or considerations, intuitively recognized, rather than exceptionless rules derived from a single principle. Determining our actual duty requires careful judgment about the relative weights of conflicting prima facie duties in the specific context.
Ross believed these duties are self-evident aspects of morality, reflecting our common moral convictions. His non-exhaustive list includes:
When these duties conflict (e.g., keeping a promise vs. preventing harm), Ross argued we must use considered judgment (intuition, refined by experience) to determine which duty takes precedence and becomes our actual duty in that situation.
Ross's theory offers a more flexible deontology than Kant's, acknowledging multiple fundamental duties identified through intuition. When duties conflict, judgment determines the actual duty, which is the prima facie duty with the greatest moral weight in that context.
Activity:
Imagine you are the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. Which ethical principles (from Kant, Ross, Utilitarianism, etc.) would you prioritize in governing the country? Why?
Distinct from rule-based deontology and outcome-focused consequentialism, virtue ethics centers on moral character. It emphasizes cultivating virtues—positive character traits like honesty, courage, compassion, justice—as the key to ethical living.
Instead of asking "What is the right action?" or "What rule should I follow?", virtue ethics asks "What kind of person should I be?" The right action is often understood as what a virtuous person would characteristically do in the circumstances.
The foundational figure in Western virtue ethics is Aristotle (384-322 BCE), particularly in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. For Aristotle, virtues (*arete*) are excellences or strengths of character developed through habituation.
Virtue ethics experienced a revival in the mid-to-late 20th century (e.g., Anscombe, Foot, MacIntyre), partly due to dissatisfaction with perceived limitations of rule-based theories in capturing the complexity of moral life.
Key questions in Aristotelian virtue ethics:
Aristotle believed the ultimate human good (*eudaimonia*) is achieved through rational activity performed virtuously or excellently over a complete life, requiring both moral and intellectual virtues, plus some external goods.
Developing Good Character:
Aristotle argued we have a natural capacity for virtue, but virtue itself is acquired through practice and habituation. Acting virtuously leads to developing virtuous habits, which form a virtuous character. Once character is formed, virtuous actions flow naturally from it.
The Doctrine of the Mean:
Moral virtue (*arete*) is typically a mean state between two vices: one of excess and one of deficiency, relative to us and the situation. This mean is determined by reason, specifically by the judgment of a person with phronesis (practical wisdom). It's not a strict mathematical average but finding the appropriate response between extremes.
Finding the mean depends on context and the individual.
| Sphere of Action/Feeling | Vice (Deficiency) | Virtue (Mean) | Vice (Excess) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fear and Confidence | Cowardice | Courage | Rashness / Foolhardiness |
| Pleasure and Pain (Bodily) | Insensibility | Temperance | Self-indulgence / Profligacy |
| Giving/Taking Money (Minor) | Stinginess / Meanness | Liberality | Prodigality / Wastefulness |
| Giving/Taking Money (Major) | Pettiness / Shabbiness | Magnificence | Vulgarity / Tastelessness |
| Honor and Dishonor (Major) | Undue Humility / Pusillanimity | Magnanimity (Pride) | Vanity / Conceit |
| Honor and Dishonor (Minor) | Lack of Ambition | Proper Ambition | Over-ambition |
| Anger | Apathy / Unirascibility | Patience / Good Temper | Irascibility / Hotheadedness |
| Self-Expression (Truth) | Understatement / Mock Modesty | Truthfulness | Boastfulness |
| Conversation (Humor) | Boorishness | Wittiness | Buffoonery |
| Social Conduct | Contentiousness / Surliness | Friendliness | Obsequiousness / Flattery |
| Shame | Shamelessness | Modesty | Shyness / Bashfulness |
| Indignation (Pain at others' fortune) | Malice / Spitefulness | Righteous Indignation | Envy |
(Note: Table adapted from various interpretations of Nicomachean Ethics)
Pleasure naturally accompanies unimpeded virtuous activity, perfecting it. It's an indicator of, but not the goal of, virtuous action. The truly pleasant life is the virtuous life, as judged by the good (*eudaimon*) person.
Friendship: Aristotle considered friendship essential for *eudaimonia*. A true friend is like a "second self."
• True friendship (based on mutual appreciation of virtue) allows for shared virtuous activity and self-reflection.
• Other forms exist based on utility or pleasure, but are less stable.
• Self-love, properly understood, involves striving for virtue and honor, which benefits friends too.
Contemplation: The highest form of human activity and happiness involves the exercise of reason in contemplation (*theoria*) – philosophical and scientific reflection.
• Reason is our highest faculty.
• Contemplation is loved for its own sake, requires leisure, and is the most self-sufficient activity, aligning with the divine element within us.
Aristotle Summary Points:
Activity:
Reflection Questions:
a. How do you understand the concept of ‘virtue’? Think of someone you consider 'virtuous'. What qualities, behaviors, or attitudes make them so?
b. Does being a 'good' professional (e.g., doctor, nurse, teacher) involve possessing certain virtues beyond technical skill? Write a short essay exploring this idea, perhaps titled 'The Caring Professional: A Life of Virtue'. Alternatively, argue why virtue might be irrelevant in professional practice.
When we debate moral questions (like famine relief obligations), philosophical inquiry operates on two levels:
Meta-ethics investigates:
While normative ethics seeks to guide action by identifying correct principles (like utilitarianism or Kantianism), meta-ethics steps back to analyze the foundations, meaning, and status of moral discourse itself.
A central meta-ethical debate concerns the nature of moral judgments (e.g., "Murder is wrong"). What kind of mental state do they express?
Cognitivism: Moral judgments express beliefs. Since beliefs aim to represent the world and can be true or false, cognitivists hold that moral judgments are truth-apt (capable of being true or false).
Non-Cognitivism: Moral judgments primarily express non-cognitive states, such as emotions (approval/disapproval), desires, or commitments to norms. Since these states are not beliefs aiming to represent facts, non-cognitivists hold that moral judgments are not truth-apt.
Cognitivist theories further divide based on their view of moral facts/properties.
Ethical Naturalism: A form of cognitivism and moral realism (the view that objective moral facts/properties exist independently of human opinion). Naturalism holds that moral properties are identical to, or reducible to, natural properties—those studied by the natural sciences or psychology (e.g., properties like maximizing happiness, promoting survival, fulfilling biological functions). Moral judgments are true/false based on these natural facts.
Sub-views include naturalist reductionism (moral properties *are* other natural properties) and non-reductionist Cornell realism (moral properties are distinct *but still natural* properties).
Ethical Non-Naturalism: Also a form of cognitivism and moral realism, but holds that moral properties are *not* natural properties. They are real, objective properties, but they are irreducible and *sui generis* (unique), distinct from the properties investigated by science. We come to know them through means like intuition (as argued by G.E. Moore) or specific forms of rational insight.
Error Theory (J.L. Mackie): A cognitivist but *anti-realist* view. Mackie agreed that moral judgments *aim* to state objective facts (express beliefs and are truth-apt). However, he argued that such objective moral facts or properties *do not actually exist*.
Why? Mackie argued objective moral properties would be "metaphysically queer"—unlike anything else in the universe—and require an equally queer epistemic faculty to detect them. He also argued they would need an inherent (and mysterious) motivating power. Since such properties don't exist, *all* positive moral judgments (e.g., "X is good," "Y is wrong") are systematically *false*. Our moral thinking involves a fundamental error.
Some theories are cognitivist (moral judgments express truth-apt beliefs) but anti-realist. These views deny that moral truths correspond to independent, objective moral facts "out there." Instead, moral truths might be seen as *constructed* by human attitudes, conventions, or ideal procedures. For example, truth might be determined by the consensus reached under ideal conditions or by our "best opinions." Moral judgments can be true/false relative to these constructed standards, but not by tracking mind-independent moral reality.
As stated earlier, Non-Cognitivism denies that moral judgments are truth-apt because they primarily express non-cognitive states (like emotions or commands) rather than beliefs about facts.
A key argument for non-cognitivism relies on internalism about motivation: the idea that there's a necessary connection between sincerely making a moral judgment (e.g., "X is good") and being motivated (at least somewhat) to act accordingly. Combined with the Humean theory of motivation (motivation requires *both* a belief *and* a separate desire), non-cognitivists argue that moral judgments cannot be mere beliefs (as beliefs alone don't motivate) and must therefore express some desire-like or motivating non-cognitive state.
Prominent Non-Cognitivist Views:
A major challenge for non-cognitivism is the Frege-Geach Problem (or Embedding Problem). Moral statements appear meaningfully in complex sentences and logical inferences (e.g., "If lying is wrong, then getting your brother to lie is wrong"). Non-cognitivist accounts struggle to explain how terms like "wrong" retain consistent meaning in these embedded contexts if they merely express emotions or commands rather than state propositions. If "lying is wrong" just means "Boo to lying!", what does the conditional premise mean?
The debate over the connection between moral judgment and motivation (internalism vs. externalism) and the nature of motivation itself (Humean vs. anti-Humean) remains central to meta-ethical discussions between cognitivists and non-cognitivists.
Activity:
Observe and note examples of ethical behavior within your family or close community. Can you classify these behaviors according to the theories discussed (utilitarian, deontological, virtue-based)? What impact do these ethical patterns have on your own life and values? Reflect on your findings.
Understanding ethics is vital for cultivating ethical behavior, essential for personal fulfillment and societal well-being. In an interconnected world, ethical considerations are increasingly important. Studying different ethical approaches benefits individuals and society.
Morality involves the principles, values, and customs governing conduct, judged as right/wrong or good/bad. These values help regulate behavior and maintain social stability. Ethics provides the theoretical framework for analyzing and justifying moral beliefs and practices.
This chapter explored major normative ethical theories: teleological/consequentialist theories (like egoism and utilitarianism), which judge actions based on outcomes; deontological theories (like Divine Command Theory, Rights Theory, Kantianism, Ross's Prima Facie Duties), which focus on duties, rules, or intentions; and virtue ethics (like Aristotle's), which emphasizes character development and virtues. It also introduced meta-ethics, which examines the meaning, nature, and justification of moral language and concepts, including debates between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. While canonical theories face critiques, contemporary approaches continue to refine ethical thought, aiming to guide moral decision-making in concrete situations.
Frankena, W. K. (1973). *Ethics* (2nd ed.). Prentice-Hall. (Note: Original text cited 1963, likely 1st ed).
Grcic, J. (1989). *Moral Choices: Ethical Theories and Problems*. West Publishing Company.
Guy, Jr., A. H. (n.d.). *Successful Ways to Teach Ethics in any Discipline*. [Source details needed].
MacIntyre, A. (1984). *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (2nd ed.). University of Notre Dame Press. (Note: Original text cited 1966 *A Short History of Ethics*, which is also relevant but *After Virtue* is key for virtue ethics revival).
Madden, T. (2000). *A Compendium of Ideas and Resources for Using Ethics Across the Curriculum*. Howard Community College.
Miller, A. (2013). *An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics* (2nd ed.). Polity Press. (Note: Corrected likely publication date from 1965).